These are very interesting issues and certainly we'll gain fairly good direction when the Supreme Court issues its opinions.

It would seem to me the issue in Edwards regarding whether a claim may exist absent an overcharge falls along the lines of running a stop sign. Go ahead and do it as long as no damages occur.

The whole idea behind the referral prohibition was the larger issue that free market forces dwindle.

Regarding fees under Cohen/Freeman this gets tougher. From the cites in the pleadings an "overcharge" is not covered by 8(b). But it seems to point to the necessity that a part of the fee be given to an entity not performing any service for that fee. It's not clear to me that Quicken Loans had any other income other than the "loan discount fee". They probably should have given it another name!!

One firm charges more because they're hosting upscale offices whereas another decides to work out of the house!  It would almost have to apply to splitting fees because the determination of charges by any individual as nominal or worthless would be monumentally difficult to ascertain. Even when splitting with someone it's going to be tough. And this borders on the unintended consequences of price controls.

There's also good argument that a "loan discount fee" is not a "settlement service fee".

Could this possibly play out with "attorney(s) fees"? Either individually or where two attorney(s) agree to split fees?